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Rights of Students
in Public Schools
by Rita Kaufman

Introduction
It can safely be said that the rights of
public school students hang in a balance.
The two sides of this balance are the
responsibilities of school officials to educate and to maintain a safe, disciplined
environment and the constitutional
guarantees in the Bill of Rights possessed
by the students. The past four terms of the
United States Supreme Court have produced three cases which address this balance.'
The constitutional guarantees of public
school students addressed in these recent
cases and in this article concern the first
and fourth amendments. As to the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court in New
Jersey '0. T.LO.2 adopted a reasonable
search standard lower than probable cause.
The
Court
adopted a
two-fold
reasonableness inquiry to determine the
constitutionality of the searches: (1) was
the action justified at its inception, and (2)
was the search reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances that justified the
search?)
As to the first amendment, the concern
has been whether the activity of the student has a disruptive effect on the educational process and whether there was a
substantial and reasonable basis for the
school's response to the questionable
action of the student. In Hazelwood School
Dist. '0. Kuhlmeier,4 the Court held that
"educators do not offend the first amendment so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."s The Court, in Bethel School Dist.
'0. Fraser,6 held that a student's delivery of
a sexually offensive and disruptive speech
at a school assembly was not protected by

the first amendment, reasoning that the
speech had disrupted the educational process and that the school officials' interest
outweighed that of the student.?
The reasonableness standard applied in
fourth amendment school cases is essentially the same as the reasonable basis standard
applied in first amendment school cases.
Both standards focus upon a factual totality of the circumstances, with emphasis
upon the special characteristics of the
school environment and the importance of
maintaining that environment.
Under the reasonableness standards,
school authorities have broad power to
curtail student activities in order to maintain the school environment. School
authorities frequently are able to justify
their actions as reasonable in light of the
concerns and public policy surrounding
certain issues in schooling, i.e., discipline,
drugs, violence, etc. This author believes
that the judicial system should not allow
these concerns to eliminate or reduce student rights.
Maryland has recently addressed the
question of student's rights versus the
school authorities in two of its localities:
Baltimore City and Prince George's County. In Baltimore City, a task force was
appointed in October, 1988, by Dr.
Richard C. Hunter, superintendent of
public schools, to study school violence.
On November 17, 1988, the task force
made the following recommendation to
the superintendent:
1. Hiring additional school police, based on an assessment of need, who will
wear uniforms but remain unarmed.
2. Establishing a highly publicized hot
line for tips on problems.

3. Buying hand-held metal detectors.
4. Installing a camera monitoring

system with an intercom in large
schools.
5. Encouraging uniforms in elementary schools and dress codes, developed
by students, parents and administrators, for the higher grades.
6. Appointing a community group to
oversee how safety procedures are put
into effect in the schools and studentparent groups in each school to resolve
safety issues.
7. Promoting parent involvement by
providing programs to assist parents
dealing with their children and setting
up rooms in schools where parents
could gather to discuss problems.8
These recommendations were adopted
on December 1, 1988. It is interesting to
note that "[t]he legal aspects of such moves
were not discussed [at the school board
meeting]".9 This is one example. of the
scale tipping in favor of the school
authorities.
Another recent example deals with
Eleanor Roosevelt High School in
Greenbelt, Maryland. The school recently
hired a new principal. The situation at
Roosevelt is much the same as the situation was at the Hazelwood school (see
infra). Roosevelt's principal had edited
articles and advertisements out of the
school newspaper. This action made students angry and the faculty sponsor!advisor of the paper quit. Hazelwood, however,
is the law and the Supreme Court has recognized the school authorities' right to
edit the newspaper.
This article traces the history of student
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rights. It begins with cases which first recognized the constitutional rights of juveniles, inside and outside of the school environment. Then, the article explores and
compares the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court concerning first and
fourth amendments in the school
environment. This analysis leads to the
author's conclusion that the Court is
moving away from the belief that students
do not shed their constitutional rights at
the school house gate. IO If this line of reasoning continues, public school officials in
the future may be able to justify as reasonable the vast majority of their actions
against students. If so, students will not be
protected to the same degree as adults by
the same Bill of Rights. Justice Stewart
expressed such a view in Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., saying, "I cannot share
the Court's uncritical assumption that
rights of children are co-extensive with
those of adults." II It appears that the present Supreme Court shares Justice Stewart's
view.

I. History of Student Rights
In response to the malfunctioning juvenile justice system, the Supreme Court
decided a number of cases in the 1960's and
the 1970's which acknowledged the applicability of certain constitutional rights to
juveniles. In Kent v. United States,12 the
Supreme Court applied the fourteenth
amendment due process clause and the
sixth amendment right to counsel to juvenile criminal proceedings. Kent held that a
waiver order from Juvenile Court to the
District Court would only be valid if (1) a
hearing had been held in the juvenile
court; (2) counsel for the juvenile had
access to the records from which the waiver decision was made; and (3) the juvenile
court had accompanied its waiver order
with a statement of the reasons for its
decision. JJ
A landmark case which recognized that
juveniles have constitutional rights equal
to those of their adult counterparts is In re
Gault. 14 The Supreme Court altered the
juvenile adjudicatory process holding that
fundamental fairness requires that due process rights be afforded to juveniles. The
Court held that a juvenile at the adjudicatory state has the same rights as an adult on
trial. These rights are: (1) notice of the
charges against him; (2) notice of the right
to counsel; (3) the right of confrontation
and cross-examination; and (4) the right
against compelled self-incrimination.
"Neither the fourteenth amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."15
In In re Winship,16 the Court announced
the standard of proof needed when a
juvenile is charged with an act that would

constitute a crime if committed by an
adult. The Court held that the applicable
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt as required by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 17
Kent, Gault, and Winship require that
states afford the same constitutional safeguards to a juvenile that are mandated for
an adult. Thus, the rights of juveniles
appear to be coextensive with the rights of
adults during the adjudicatory stages.
The constitutional rights of students in
the school context were recognized by the
Court over forty years ago.18 In 1942, the
West Virginia Board of Education passed a
resolution requiring teachers and students
to salute the flag. "Refusal to salute the flag
[was] regarded as an act of insubordination, and ... dealt with accordingly."19
The Court held that it was a violation of
the first amendment for a state to make it
compulsory for children to pledge allegiance to the flag. 20 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he fourteenth amendment ...
protects the citizen against the State and all
of its creatures, Boards of Education not
excepted. These have ... important .,.

"Neither the
fourteenth
amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for
adults alone."
and highly discretionary functions, but
none that they may not perform within
the limits of the Bill of Rights."21
In 1968, Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist. 22 provided student rights advocates
with their last big victory. In the context
of the first amendment, the Court stated:
"School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons'
under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the
state must respect .... "23 The first
amendment expression in Tinker was the
wearing of black armbands to school to
protest the United States involvement in
Vietnam. The principals of the Des
Moines school district learned of the plan
and established a rule prohibiting such
conduct. Students who wore the bands
were suspended from school until they
returned without them. Other items,
however, such as the iron cross Nazi
symbol, were not banned.

The Court noted that the wearing of the
armbands was a quiet, passive, nondisruptive act that neither infringed on the
rights of other students nor materially and
substantially interfered with the educational process. 24 Even when "applied in
light of the special characteristics of the
school environment," first amendment
rights are available to students.25 The
Court stated:
A student's rights, therefore, do not
embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours, he may express
his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if
he does so without "materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school" and
without colliding with the rights of
others. 26
The common bond in the foregoing
cases is the overall awareness of the Bill of
Rights application to students, even with
frequent reference to the special nature of
schools. Today, twenty years later, schools
face many of the same problems. They also
face new, or at least greatly increased, problems in the nature of drugs, weapons and
teenage pregnancy. These new elements in
the schools have caused legitimate apprehension. The question of whether a student's actions materially and substantially
interfere is overshadowed by the drive to
rid the schools of these problems. The Bill
of Rights requirements are becoming less
stringent when applied to students. With
the standards for compliance relaxed, are
the rights of students being jeopardized?
Are fear and public outcry molding new
standards for the school environment? The
three recent Supreme Court cases seem to
suggest that the standard applied to students is a lesser standard than that applied
to adults.
II. Fourth Amendment Searches
The right of the people to be secure in
their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seizedP
Prior to 1985, lower courts had addressed
the fourth amendment's application to
school searches. In Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. School Dist.,28 the Fifth Circuit held
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that dog sniffin~ -.earches of the entire student body violated the fourth amendment.
The court acknowledged that the fourth
amendment's basic concern is reasonableness and that this reasonableness depends
on the circumstances of each case. The
court recognized that reasonable cause is
the usual standard applied when action
must be taken to maintain a safe environment conducive to education. The court
pointed out, however, that "[t]he Constitution does not permit good intentions to
justify objectively outrageous intrusions
on student privacy."29 The court concluded that dog sniffing constituted a search
under the fourth amendment and that
individualized suspICIOn would be
required in order for the search to be constitutional. In 1984, the Sixth Circuit held
that the fourth amendment required a
school official to have reasonable cause to
conduct a search. JO The court noted "that
not only must there be a reasonable
ground to search, the search itself must be
reasonable."JI
In 1985, the United States Supreme
Court decided New Jersey v. T.LO.,J2 a
landmark case in the area of searches in the
school environment. In T.LO., a teacher
observed two female students smoking in
the bathroom. Because the bathroom was
not a designated smoking area, the students (one was the defendant, T.L.O.)
were brought to the vice-principal. When
T.L.O. denied smoking, the vice-principal
took her into an office and asked to see her
purse. Upon opening it, he discovered a
pack of cigarettes, rolling papers, marijuana, a pipe, a substantial amount of money
in one dollar bills, an index card of
LO.U.'s, and two letters implicating
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. Delinquency
charges were subsequently brought against
T.L.O.
At the time of the search in T.LO., there
were three possible theories on which to
justify a student search: in loco parentis;
fourth amendment probable cause; and
fourth amendment reasonable suspicion.
The New Jersey Supreme Court applied
the in loco parentis theory, which means
that school officials, in dealing with their
students, obtain their authority from the
parents. The New Jersey court held that
the fourth amendment applies, but that
the doctrine of in loco parentis lowers the
standard used in determining the reasonableness of the search. The interests the
court considered in lowering the standard
were the educational atmosphere, the reasonable expectations of the students, and
the realities of the classroom environment.
The state court considered the following
factors in determining the sufficiency of
the cause to search: (1) age and school

record of the individual; (2) prevalence and
seriousness of the problem in the school;
(3) exigency of the situation; (4) probative
value and reliability of information justifying the search; and (5) the teacher's prior
experience with the student.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the in loco parentis standard and its
notion of parental authority. The Court
noted that public school authorities are
state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression H and due process,34 and that it is
difficult to understand why they should be
deemed to be exercising parental rather
than public authority when conducting
searches of their students. J5
The Court, however, also rejected
application of the mandates of probable
cause under the fourth amendment. The
Court stated that the student's interest in
privacy must be balanced against the
school's interest in maintaining discipline
and a safe environment and that "this balancing requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject."J6 The
fourth amendment requires a warrant and
probable cause. The Court opined that the
warrant requirement is unsuited to the

CCThe Court, ...
rejected application
of the mandates of
probab le cause . . . "
school environment because such a
requirement would interfere with the
maintenance of discipline,J7 and that probable cause is not an irreducible requirement. J8 "The fundamental command of
the fourth amendment is that searches and
seizures be reasonable."J9
The Court in T.L O. adopted the third
theory for justifying school searches, that
of fourth amendment reasonable suspicion. The Court then applied, for the first
time in the context of a school search, its
Terry v. Ohio40 two-prong test for
reasonableness. This dual fourth amendment reasonableness test was first used in
Terry to allow police officers to intrude
upon an individual's fourth amendment
interest without a warrant or probable
cause, but based on a reasonable suspi.
cion,, 1 Specifically, the two-prong inquiry

under the test is "whether the ... action was
justified at its inception, and whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."42
In applying the two-prong reasonableness test to school search situations, this
broad authority to search could be used
whenever there is an alleged violation of a
rule of the school, or whenever there is
interference with school discipline and
order. The search, however, must still be
reasonable in light of the particular violation. The Court opined that the opening
of the purse was justified based on the
teacher's observations of the two students
smoking. One commentator, critical of
T.LO.'s holding, expressed the view that
the discovery of the cigarettes answered
the vice-principal's question and thus the
search should have ended at that point. In
addition, "the school official did not have
probable cause to conduct the search since
neither possession of cigarettes nor lying
about one's smoking habits is relevant to
whether a student has been smoking in a
non-designated area in the school."43 The
Court, however, did not consider this factor but merely applied the two-prong test,
answering both questions affirmatively.
"The reasonableness standard should
ensure that the interests of students will be
invaded no more than is necessary to
achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools."H No safeguards,
however, are set forth in the standard to
accompany this assurance. The interests of
the students, in effect, are left in the hands
of school authorities.
T.LO. leaves the following areas unresolved: the standard to be applied in locker
searches45 or student automobile searches;46 whether individualized suspicion is
required;·7 the permissibility of strip searches;48 and whether the standard should be
different when there is police involvement,, 9 Because of the need to maintain
order and discipline within the school
environment, school authorities may conduct a search, not justified on probable
cause but on a lesser, reasonableness standard for children. Hence, in the fourth
amendment area, student's rights are not
coextensive with those of adults.
In post- T.L O. cases courts have held that
reasonable suspicion is the proper standard
to determine the validity of a search by a
school official. In Cason v. COOk,50 a female
high school student challenged a search
conducted by the female vice-principal.
The search was conducted in the presence
of a female police officer who was assigned
to the school as a liaison officer. As a result
of the search, a stolen coin purse was
found. The police officer conducted a pat-
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down of Cason only after the stolen coin
purse was found. The Eighth Circuit
rejected imposing a probable cause warrant requirement. The police liaison did
not initiate the search nor question Cason.
The school official initiated the investigation, acting upon her own authority, not
that of the police. The court held that the
correct standard to apply was the standard
enunciated in T.L O.
Even in situations in which the school
official is acting in loco parentis, such as
chaperoning a school trip, the courts have
relied on the standards enunciated in
T.LO. In Webb v. McCullouglJ51, a high
school principal searched a student's hotel
room during a field trip. The room
searched was assigned to Webb and three
other female students. The principal had
been informed by other chaperones that
the students had consumed alcohol and
that they had used an unoccupied room
adjacent to Webb's room. Although the
Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for failure to correctly apply
test, the court did note that
the T.L
T.L O. governs searches of students by
school officials.
The reasonableness standard announced
in T.LO. has consistently withstood challenges of unconstitutionality. Today, the
need to maintain a particular school environment outweighs the right of the student to be secure from unreasonable
searches. The student thus becomes the
victim, learning the lesson of double standards; one for adults and a lesser standard
for the student.

o.

III. First Amendment
Expression

Speech

and

Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. 52

In 1986, the United States Supreme
Court decided Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser6 3• In Bethel, sanctions were
imposed against a student for giving an
indecent, lewd, and offensive speech. Fraser nominated a fellow student for office
during an assembly that was mandatory
for the students. His nominating speech
was full of sexual metaphors:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm
in his pants, he's fum in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most...of al~
his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm.

Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his
point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the
wall. He doesn't attack things in
spurts-he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very
end-even the climax, for each and
every one of yoU.54
The speech evoked the student audience
to jeer, hoot, holler, and simulate the acts
to which Fraser was alluding. Fraser was
found to have violated a school disciplinary rule. He was suspended for three days
and his name was removed from the list of
candidates for graduation speaker. Fraser,
however, only served two of the three suspended days and was the graduation speaker, having been elected as a write-in
candidate.

"The reasonableness
standard announced
in T.L.O. has
consistently
withstood challenges
of
unconstitutionality. "
The Supreme Court upheld the actions
by the school. Although school officials
do not have limitless discretion to apply
their own notions of indecency, the
nominating speech was found to be
offensive and to have disrupted the
educational process of the school.55
Referring to T.LO., the Court once again
expressed the view that the rights of
students in public schools are not
"automatically coextensive" with the
rights of adults: "It does not follow ...that
simply because the use of an offensive
form of expression may not be prohibited
to adults making what the speaker
considers a political point, that same
latitude must be permitted to children in a
public school."56 The school board may
decide what form of speech is appropriate
and the first amendment is not offended if
it is found that the speech "would
undermine the school's basic educational
mission."57 Fraser's speech disrupted the
educational process and therefore no
balancing was required.
More recently, in Hazelwood School Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier,58 the United States Supreme
Court stated that the first amendment

rights of students in public schools "are
not automatically coe"xtensive with the
rights of adults in other settings," and
must be "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment."59 Hazelwood involved a high
school newspaper (the Spectrum) and its
editorial process. The paper was written
by the school's journalism class. The teacher in charge of the class submitted proofs
to the principal prior to publication as part
of the normal editorial process followed
by the school. In its final issue for the
school year, two articles disturbed the
principal. One dealt with teenage pregnancy and the other addressed divorce. Each
page on which these articles appeared was
withheld from publication in its entirety.
Consequently, six articles were removed
from the final issue. The principal believed
that this was the only means available to
make sure the paper would be published
by the end of the school year. The students
challenged the principal's action as constituting censorship in violation of their first
amendment rights. They also claimed that
the Spectrum was a public forum. The
Supreme Court held that the students' first
amendment rights were not violated by
the principal's actions.
In 1943, the Court held that "it is now
a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is
tolerated by our Constitution only when

the expression presents a clear and present
danger ofaction of a kind the State is empo·
wered to prevent and punish. "60 In 1966, the
Fifth Circuit stated:
[S]chool officials cannot ignore expressions of feeling with which they do
not wish to contend. They cannot
infringe on their students' rights to
free and unrestricted expression as
guaranteed to them under the First
Amendment to the Constitution,
where the exercise of such rights in the
school buildings and schoolrooms do
not materially and substantially inter-

fere with the requirements ofappropriate
discipline in the operation ofthe school 61
Hazelwood moves away from these recognitions. The two newspaper articles presented no clear and present danger to the
school nor did they materially and
susbstantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school. Instead, it was
merely a situation in which the topics discussed and the manner in which they were
presented bothered the principal.
Bethel held "the undoubted freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views
in schools and classrooms that must be balanced against the society's counter-
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vailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."62 Although an argument might be
made that teen pregnancy exceeds these
boundaries, it should be balanced against
the need to make students aware of the
risks of engaging in sex. Teen sex is not
necessarily advocated by publishing an
article on teen pregnancy. The process of
balancing first amendment interests
against the boundaries of socially apprcr
priate behavior may leave students
unprotected, not only when their constitutional rights are concerned, but also when
adult decisions are involved.
The Court in Hazelwood balanced the
student's rights with the countervailing
interests and held that the school's action
was reasonably related to legitimate concerns and that the school censoring of the
articles was done in an editorial role. The
Court also rejected the notion that the
paper was a public forum. 63 The school
newspaper is not a traditional public
forum and hence the school need not demonstrate compelling reasons for the removal of the articles. The Spectrum was a
product of the journalism class.
Hazelwood was also distinguished from
the first amendment question addressed in
Tinker. The Court stated that "the question addressed in Tinker is different from
the question whether the first amendment
requires schools affirmatively to promote
particular student speech."64 Tinker dealt
with personal expression. Hazelwood,
however, was concerned with expression
which might reasonably be perceived "to
bear the imprimatur of the school."65
Therefore, the Court held that the standard was not the same and "educators do
not offend the first amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."66 This
standard is consistent with the view that
education is not the responsibility of the
courts. The principal was concerned that
the teen pregnancy article did not protect
the identity of those involved and was
inappropriate for younger students. His
objection with the divorce article was that
it named parents without their consent
and did not present their view on the
topic. The Court ruled that these shortcomings with the articles justified the principal's actions.
Justice Brennan's dissent characterized
the Spectrum as a "forum established to
give students an opportunity to express
their views."67 He expressed his view that
the deleted articles "neither disrupte[d]
classwork nor invade[d] the rights of
others:"6B The dissent felt the first amend-

ment standard of Tinker was relevant to
Hazelwood. Tinker dealt with speech that
"materially disrupts." In Hazelwood, six
articles were deleted, not just the two that
disturbed the principal. The dissenters
believed that the principal could have
removed those two articles only, and
characterized the removal of all six as "un-·
thinking
contempt
for
individual
rights."69
These recent first amendment cases are
silencing students' views. To have a controversial opinion and to express it are prcr
tected first amendment rights. The recent
court opinions indicate that this right is
diminishing in the school environment.
The standard of "materially and substantially interfere" is both vague and overbroad and allows school authoritites broad
discretionary power to curtail speech and
ideas of which they disapprove.
Conclusion
These three recent Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate the manner in
which students' rights are "balanced"
against the concerns of schools in maintaining the school environment. This balancing test occurs in both first and fourth
amendment areas. Today, schools'
interests outweigh the student's rights. No
protections are announed in this balancing
test for guaranteeing that schools will not
overstep their authority. The silence may
be partly based on the belief "that the education of the nation's youth is primarily
the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges."70 The focal point of the
balancing test is one of fact-bound
reasonableness.
Recently, a federal district court in
Indiana upheld as reasonable a high
school's proposed program for drug testing its athletes. 71 The court relied on
T.L 0., noting that the T.L o. decision
does not require individualized suspicion.
The court held that the random urinalysis

.cCSchools' interests
outweigh the
student's rights."
testing program "constitutes [a] search
that is justified at its inception by [the]
school's legitimate need to ensure drugfree athletes and [the testing program]
reasonably balances school's needs against
students' privacy interests and thus, does
not violate the fourth amendment."72

Because the program had not yet been
implemented, the court saw no reason to
issue a prior judicial restraint.
A final question is whether the Bill of
Rights even protects students. This
question is avoided with the answer that
students' rights are not coextensive with
those of adults. 73 If not coextensive, do
these protections exist at all?
The Court seems to be saying that the
Bill of Rights does protect students, but
the applicable standards in applying the
Bill of Rights are less stringent in the first
and fourth amendment areas. The reason
for the lessening of the standards is the
concern and desire to maintain a particular
school environment. The school rules and
regulations are seen as reasonable means of
accomplishing this goal. Although
students do not yield their rights, they
must forego some of the protection
afforded adults by the same rights. As the
federal court in Indiana noted:
Over the course of the last few years,
the Supreme Court of the United
States has clearly defined the
constitutional rights of students in the
public school setting, as different than
rights enjoyed in other settings.
Although it remains true that students
do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of expression at the
schoolhouse gate," that concept has
been considerably narrowed and
refined by subsequent cases.74
If the Supreme Court continues its present
course, the concept will become even
more narrowed and refined.
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